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Louisiana:  Hot and Spicy! 
 
 
Jonathan O. Knuckey, Christine L. Day, and Charles D. Hadley 
 
 At the beginning of the 2004 presidential election campaign, Louisiana 
was considered a potential battleground state. While George W. Bush had 
won the Bayou State in 2000, his victory margin of just under eight percent-
age points was modest, and the smallest margin of any of the five Deep 
South states. Given that Bill Clinton had carried the state twice in the 1990s, 
and, given a Democratic advantage in party identification, Democratic 
strategists felt that the Kerry/Edwards ticket could at least make the Bush-
Cheney ticket spend time and valuable resources defending the state, but it 
was not to be. 
 
Political Context 
 
 Democratic optimism in Louisiana was motivated by the fact that the 
party had won two closely contested statewide elections in the previous two 
years. In 2002, Democratic incumbent U.S. Senator Mary Landrieu defeated 
her Republican opponent Suzanne Haik Terrell, the Commissioner of Elec-
tions and former New Orleans City Councilwoman. Landrieu initially was 
elected by the narrowest of margins in 1996 when she defeated archcon-
servative Louis Woody Jenkins by a margin of just 5,788 votes (Hadley 
and Knuckey 1997). In 2002, Landrieu received 46 percent of the vote in 
Louisianas unique open primary systemwhere all candidates run against 
each other regardless of partycompared to Terrells 27 percent. However, 
the combined vote for the Republican candidates totaled 51 percent, suggest-
ing that Terrell could win if she were able to unite the Republican vote. 
Having regained control of the U.S. Senate in the 2002 midterm elections, 
Republicans were eager to add to their narrow majority, and consequently 
Republican leaders campaigned aggressively on behalf of Terrell, including 
President Bush, former President George H. W. Bush, Vice President Dick 
Cheney, former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani, U.S. Senator Trent Lott of 
Mississippi, and U.S. Senator-elect Elizabeth Dole of North Carolina (Welch 
2002). The election was given further national prominence when Landrieu 
and Terrell debated each other on NBCs Meet the Press. 
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 Despite the efforts of Republicans to nationalize the election, Landrieu 
was able to defeat Terrell. Although the runoff remained close, Landrieus 
margin in 2002 was more comfortable than in 1996, 52 percent of the vote 
compared to Terrells 48 percent. Perhaps working in Landrieus favor was 
the fact that control of the U.S. Senate did not depend on the outcome, as 
some pundits had predicted prior to the midterm elections. Thus, voters in 
Louisiana could support Landrieu in the knowledge that they would not be 
throwing the Senate to the Democrats. Indeed, Landrieu emphasized in the 
runoff that she shared many of President Bushs positions, although, unlike, 
Terrell, she would not simply be there to rubber-stamp the presidents 
agenda. 
 Two other factors proved decisive in Landrieus favor. First, she bene-
fited from a strong get-out-the-vote effort among black voters by Congres-
sional Black Caucus members who campaigned for her in New Orleans and 
around the state, especially in black churches (Online NewsHour 2002; cf. 
Sellers 2002). The mobilization of the Democratic base also was helped by 
automated telephone messages from former President Bill Clinton. 
 Second, in the last week of the campaign Landrieu focused on the issue 
of Mexican sugar imports and their impact on Louisiana sugar cane growers, 
accusing Terrell of supporting the White House in a secret deal that would 
double the flow of sugar coming from Mexico, a claim Terrell vigorously 
denied. These charges may have helped Landrieu in the crucial Acadiana 
region, the location of Louisianas sugar cane producers. Here Landrieu 
received 52 percent of the vote, having lost the region with 48 percent six 
years earlier. Furthermore, of the thirteen parishes (i.e., the top quintile) 
where Landrieus vote increased the most compared to 1996, nine parishes 
had a sizeable dependence on the sugar cane industry. (On the sugar issue, 
see Naresh 2002; Hockstader and Hossiter 2002.) 
 The 2003 gubernatorial election was regarded as an important test of 
statewide strength for both political parties, given that popular two-term 
Republican Governor Murphy J. Mike Foster was constitutionally pro-
hibited from seeking a third term. Republicans, keen for an unprecedented 
third consecutive gubernatorial victory, united early behind Bobby Jindal, an 
acknowledged rising star in the party. Jindal at the age of 32 had already 
served in the Bush Administration as Assistant Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services as well 
as Louisianas Secretary of Health and Hospitals under Governor Foster. 
Moreover, in a state where race has often loomed large in statewide elec-
tions, Jindal, whose parents were immigrants from India, presented a dif-
ferent face for the Republican Party. On the Democratic side no clear favo-
rite emerged, following the decision earlier in the year of popular U.S. Sena-
tor John Breaux to not run for governor.1 Of the three serious Democratic 
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contenders, Lieutenant-Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco was con-
sidered to have an edge over Attorney General Richard Ieyoub and former 
member of the U.S. House of Representatives, Claude Buddy Leach. 
 In the Louisiana-style gubernatorial primary, Jindal finished first with 
33 percent, the highest share of the vote for a candidate in the first round of 
a gubernatorial election with no incumbent running since 1987. Blanco fin-
ished second to claim the runoff spot, but her 18 percent of the vote was the 
lowest share of the vote a runoff candidate has received since 1971. Ieyoub 
and Leech received 16 and 14 percent of the vote, respectively. The remain-
der of the vote was split between 13 other candidates, the largest share going 
to State Senate President Randy Ewing, who received nine percent.  
 In the runoff election, the challenge for Jindal was to maintain his con-
servative support from the primary election while moderating his stance 
enough to capture the support of Ieyoub and Leech voters. Blanco faced the 
familiar challenge of a Democrat in a statewide race, the challenge of uniting 
the fractured party vote behind her. Further illustrating the Democratic 
divide was New Orleans Democratic Mayor Ray Nagins endorsement of 
Republican Jindal. Until the last week of the campaign, polls showed Jindal 
holding a consistent lead over Blanco; a poll released by the University of 
New Orleans found Jindal leading Blanco 44 to 40 percent with 16 percent 
undecided (Howell 2003). 
 In the final week of the campaign, however, Blanco unleashed a series 
of blistering negative ads against Jindal, accusing him of cutting costs and 
hurting patient care, particularly for the poor, when he was Secretary of the 
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals. She also portrayed Jindal as 
an extremist, contrasting his no-exceptions position on abortion (even with 
the mothers life at stake) with her own slightly more flexible pro-life posi-
tion. Jindal never adequately responded to these charges, allowing Blanco to 
close the gap on him going into the day of the election. With momentum 
now behind her, Blanco was able to win with 52 percent of the vote com-
pared to Jindals 48 percent, thus becoming the first woman governor in 
Louisiana history and the only current Democratic governor of a Deep South 
state. Despite the close margin of victory, Blanco secured a majority of the 
vote in 52 of Louisianas 64 parishes, showing strength in many of the 
sparsely populated rural counties. This suggests the possibility of racial vot-
ing against Jindal, especially in the northern part of the state which has been 
fertile territory for racial protest candidates from Strom Thurmond in 1948 
to George Wallace in 1968 (Howard 1972) and to David Duke in the early 
1990s (see, for example, Rose 1992, Bridges 1994, and Howell 1994).2 
 In sum, Democratic candidates had won two highly visible recent state-
wide elections, giving the party some hope for the presidential race. At the 
same time, the idiosyncratic factors that swayed the outcome of both elec-
tions surely dampened the Democrats confidence. 
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General Election Results and Analysis 
 
Presidential Election 
 
 As early as August, a month before the general election campaign had 
officially started, most polls showed incumbent President George W. Bush 
with a double-digit lead over U.S. Senator John Kerry, prompting the Demo-
cratic ticket to essentially pull out of the state by mid-September (AP 2004). 
Thus, the question was not whether Bush would carry Louisianas nine Elec-
toral College votes, but what would be the size of his victory margin over 
Kerry. 
 Voter turnout in Louisiana, based on the voting-age population, was 
58.5 percent, the highest turnout rate of any of the eleven southern states, 
and slightly higher than the nationwide turnout rate of 56.2 percent. This 
represented an increase over the 2000 presidential election turnout (55.2 per-
cent), although it was less than that in 1992 (59.8 percent), which remains 
the highest voter turnout rate for the state in the post-Voting Rights Act era. 
Among registered voters, turnout was 66.5 percent, with whites having a 
turnout rate of 70.4 percent and blacks 61.1 percent.3 Overall, the total vote 
in Louisiana increased to just over 1.9 million in 2004 from 1.7 million in 
2000. (See Knuckey and Hadley 2002 on the 2000 presidential election in 
Louisiana.) Interestingly, this increase was almost entirely a result of the 
increase of 174,298 in the Republican vote, compared to just a 27,955 in-
crease in the Democratic vote. Contrary to the conventional wisdom of a 
higher level of voter turnout in 2004 being beneficial to the Democrats, it 
appears that a strong Republican mobilization effort helped the partys 
candidates in Louisiana just as it did nationally (Bumiller, Halbfinger and 
Rosenbaum 2004; cf. Alpert 2004). 
 As the polls had indicated, Republican Bush easily carried Louisianas 
nine Electoral College votes, defeating Democrat Kerry by 14.5 percentage 
points, 56.7 to 42.2 (see Table 1). Bushs margin of victory was almost 
double that he enjoyed over Al Gore in the 2000 contest (7.7 percentage 
points), and it was the largest Republican margin of victory in the state since 
Ronald Reagans re-election victory in 1984 (22.6 percentage points). In-
deed the only other Republican presidential candidate who achieved a larger 
victory margin was Richard Nixon in 1972 (37.0 percentage points). Of 
course, both Reagan and Nixon carried the state in election years that were 
national landslides for the Republicans. 
 
Geography 
 
 An analysis of the presidential vote by parish (county) reveals the geo-
graphic  breadth  of  Bushs  victory. Bush carried a majority of  the  vote  in  
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Table 1. Results of the 2004 Louisiana 
Presidential and Congressional Elections 
 
 
Candidate (Party) Percent of Vote Vote Totals 
 
 
President 
 George W. Bush / Dick Cheney (R) 56.7 1,102,169 
 John Kerry / John Edwards (D) 42.2 820,299 
 Ralph Nader / Peter Camejo (I) 0.4 7,032 
 Michael Peroutka / Charles Baldwin (C) 0.3 5,203 
 Michael Badnarik / Richard Campagna (L) 0.1 2,781 
 Walt Brown Brown / Mary Alice Herbert (S) 0.1 1,785 
 Amondson / Pletten (P) 0.1 1,566 
 David Cobb / Patricia LaMarche (G) 0.1 1,276 
 James E. Harris, Jr. / Maggie Trowe (SW) 0.1 985 
  Total Presidential Vote  1,943,096 
 
U.S. Senate 
 David Vitter (R) 51.0 943,014 
 Chris John (D) 29.3 542,150 
 John Kennedy (D) 14.9 275,821 
 Arthur A. Morrell (D) 2.6 47,222 
 Richard M. Fontanesi (I) 0.8 15,097 
 R.A. Skip Galan (I) 0.7 12,463 
 Sam Houston Melton, Jr. (D) 0.7 12,289 
  Total Senate Vote  1,848,056 
 
U.S. House of Representatives 
 First District (Greater New Orleans Suburbs) 
  Bobby Jindal (R) 78.4 225,708 
  Roy Armstrong (D)  6.7 19,266 
  M.V. Vinny Mendoza (D) 4.4 12,779 
  Daniel Zimmerman (D) 4.2 12,135 
  Jerry Watts (D) 3.5 10,034 
  Mike Rogers (R) 2.8 7,975 
   Total District Vote  287,897 
  
 Second District (New Orleans) 
  William J. Jefferson (D)* 79.0 173,510 
  Arthur L. Art Schwertz (R) 21.0 46,097 
   Total District Vote  219,607 
 
 Third District (New Iberia-Houma)** 
  Charles Melancon (D) 50.2 57,611 
  W.J. Billy Tauzin, III (R) 49.8 57,042 
   Total District Vote  114,653 
 
 Fourth District (Shreveport-Bossier City) 
  Jim McCrery (R)* Unopposed 
table continues . . .     
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
 
Candidate (Party) Percent of Vote Vote Totals 
 
 
U.S. House of Representatives (continued) 
 Fifth District (Monroe-Alexandria) 
  Rodney Alexander (R)* 59.4 141,495 
  Zelma Tisa Blakes (D) 24.6 58,591 
  John W. Jock Scott (R) 16.0 37,971 
   Total District Vote  238,057 
 
 Sixth District (Baton Rouge) 
  Richard H. Baker (R)* 72.2 189,106 
  Rufus Holt Craig, Jr. (D) 19.4 50,732 
  Edward Anthony Scott Galmon 8.4 22,031 
   Total District Vote  261,869 
 
 Seventh District (Lake Charles-Lafayette)** 
  Charles Boustany, Jr. (R) 55.0 75,039 
  Willie Landry Mount (D) 45.0  61,493 
   Total District Vote  136,532 
 
Key: * = incumbent; R = Republican Party; D = Democratic Party; I = Independent; C = Constitu-
tion Party; L = Libertarian Party; S = Socialist Party; P = Prohibition Party; G = Green Party; SW = 
Socialist Workers Party; ** = Runoff election held December 4, 2004. 
Note: Louisiana operates under an open electoral system in which all candidates run in a primary 
election. If no candidate secures a majority of the vote in the primary election, the top two conten-
ders, regardless of party, face each other in a runoff election. Runoffs were necessary for the Third 
and Seventh Districts, and thus these are the results reported, rather than those for the primary 
election. 
Source: Compiled by the authors from election returns obtained from the Louisiana Secretary of 
State Elections Division; see www.sec.state.la.us/elections/elections-index.htm. 
 
 
 
54 of Louisianas 64 parishes, winning all of the parishes he had carried in 
2000 plus four parishes won by Gore. The ten parishes carried by Kerry 
were those with majority or near majority black populations, mostly the old 
plantation parishes along the Mississippi River. 
 Overall, Bush built on the foundations of his 2000 victory in the state, 
as evidenced by the near perfect parish-by-parish correlation of his 2000 and 
2004 vote (r = .98). By dividing the state into four geographic regions 
(Greater New Orleans, Acadiana, Florida Parishes, and North-Central), one 
can discern areas of Republican strength and areas where Bush was most 
successful in increasing his vote totals in the state (Table 2).4  
 Only in the Greater New Orleans area did Kerry lead Bush, albeit by 
the narrowest of margins, 49.6 to 49.5 percent. However, this was due to 
Kerrys vote in overwhelmingly black and Democratic Orleans Parish (New 
Orleans), where Kerry bested Bush  77.4  to  21.7 percent. Bush made up this  
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Table 2. Louisiana 2004 Presidential Vote by Region (in percent) 
 
 
    % Change in 
 Proportion of   Republican Vote 
Region State Vote Bush Kerry 2000-2004 
 
 
Greater New Orleans   27.3 49.5 49.6 +2.7 
Acadiana   30.9 58.2 40.5 +5.1 
Florida Parishes   15.8 58.9 40.1 +4.3 
North-Central   25.9 61.2 37.7 +4.5 
Total 100.0 56.7 42.2 +4.1 
 
Note: See endnote 4 for a definition of the parishes than constitute each region. 
Source: Computed by the authors from election returns obtained from the Louisiana Secretary of 
State Elections Division; see www.sec.state.la.us/elections/elections-index.htm. 
 
 
 
deficit in the suburbanand predominantly whiteparishes of the Greater 
New Orleans area by winning 66 percent of the vote compared to 33.2 for 
Kerry. In the other three regions Bush won by landslide margins. The 
Florida Parishes and the parishes in the North-Central part of the state have 
become Republican strongholds, and in 2004 Bush won 58.9 and 61.2 per-
cent, respectively. Interestingly Bush built on the breakthrough he had made 
in 2000 in Acadiana, which consists of those parishes in the southern part of 
the state with high proportions of French-Catholic Cajuns, a group that has 
historically exhibited a tendency to be more Democratic than other white 
voters in the state.5 Bush increased his vote in Acadiana to 58.2 percent in 
2004 from 53.1 percent in 2000, suggesting an on-going realignment of 
party preferences in Cajun Country. The causes of such realignment can-
not be probed here, although cultural issues and the values divide appear 
to be prime candidates in producing this pro-Republican shift in voting 
preferences at the presidential level.6 
 
Race, Gender, Age, and Income 
 
 Racial polarization characterized the vote choice in Louisiana as in 
prior presidential elections (e.g., Knuckey and Hadley 2002; Hadley 1994) 
and as in the rest of the South. According to exit polls (Table 3), Bush 
received 75 percent of the white vote, while Kerry secured 90 percent of the 
black vote. (Unless otherwise indicated, data on various demographic and 
other voter groups are drawn from the exit poll data from the 2004 National 
Election Pool, conducted by Edison Media Research and Mitofsky Inter-
national.) The rule of thumb in a statewide election in Louisiana is that a 
Republican  needs  approximately  two-thirds  of  the  white  vote,  which  Bush  
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Table 3. Demographic and Political Factors 
in the 2004 Presidential Vote (in percentages) 
 
 
Voter Characteristic/Attitude Bush Kerry Percent of Category 
 
 
Race 
 White 75 24 70 
 Black   9 90 27 
Gender 
 Men 60 39 45 
 Women 54 45 55 
Gender (controlling for race) 
 White men 77 23 33 
 White women 74 25 38 
 Black men 14 83 12 
 Black women 13 87 17 
Age 
 18-29 53 45 20 
 30-44 56 42 30 
 45-59 53 47 27 
 60+ 66 34 20 
Income 
 Under $15,000 39 60 13 
 $15-30,000 49 50 19 
 $30-50,000 56 44 23 
 $50-$75,000 69 29 19 
 $75-$100,000 65 34 11 
 Over $10,000 68 31 13 
Party Identification 
 Democrat 21 78 42 
 Republican 95   5 40 
 Independent 58 39 18 
Ideology 
 Liberal 25 74 17 
 Moderate 51 47 44 
 Conservative 80 19 40 
Bush Job Approval 
 Approve 92   8 58 
 Disapprove   8 91 41 
Religion 
 Protestant 59 39 49 
 Catholic 68 31 38 
 Other 23 76   6 
 None 23 76   5 
table continues . . .     
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
 
Voter Characteristic/Attitude Bush Kerry Percent of Category 
 
 
Religion and Frequency of Church Attendance 
 Protestant/weekly 73 25 14 
 Protestant/less often  63 37 10 
 Catholic/weekly 71 29 19 
 Catholic/less often  64 34 17 
 All others 40 60 35 
White Evangelical/Born Again 
 Yes 85 15 27 
 No 47 52 73 
Most Important Issue for Vote 
 Terrorism 84 15 22 
 Moral values 86 12 21 
 Economy/Jobs 24 74 18 
 War in Iraq 34 65 14 
 Taxes 62 35   6 
 Health care 33 66   6 
 Education 28 70   5 
Most Important Candidate Quality 
 Strong leader 86 14 20 
 Will bring change   5 94 20 
 Clear stand on issues 73 23 15 
 Cares about people 37 63 14 
 Religious faith 94   5 10 
 Honest/trustworthy 78 21 10 
 Intelligent 36 64   5 
 
Source: Edison/Mitofsky Exit Polls (Louisiana), November 2, 2004. 
 
 
 
easily achieved. Likewise, Kerry fell far short of the one-third of the white 
vote he would have needed to secure a victory. Indeed, the 24 percent of the 
white vote that Kerry won was two percent lower than the white vote Al 
Gore received in 2000, and the lowest share any Democratic presidential 
nominee has received since Walter Mondale in 1984.7 In 2004, this meant 
that the black vote again accounted for over half (58 percent) of the total 
Democratic presidential vote. Likewise, the Republican vote in Louisiana 
remains an overwhelmingly white vote, Bush having only increased his per-
centage among blacks by 3 percentage points. 
 As in the rest of a nation, a gender gap was evident in the presidential 
vote, with Bush having a 21 percentage point lead among men, but just a 
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nine point lead among women. However, this lead among women was 
actually greater than in 2000, when Bush basically split the womens vote 
with Gore, 50 to 49 percent. When race is controlled for, the gender gap 
virtually disappears, with both white men and white women giving landslide 
levels of support to Bush, 77 and 74 percent respectively. White women are 
often viewed as a group that might be more prone to an appeal by Democrats 
in the Southat least when compared to white men. On the basis of the 
2004 results, they remain well out of reach for any Democrat at the presi-
dential level in Louisiana. 
 Although Bush carried every age group in Louisiana, there was a 
noticeable difference between the youngest group (18-29), where Bushs 
margin over Kerry was eight percentage points, and the oldest group (60 and 
over), where Bushs margin was 32 percentage points. Interestingly, this 
represents a reversal of the pattern in 2000, where the youngest age group 
was Bushs most supportive group, and the oldest group was his weakest. 
Indeed, in 2000, the over-60 group was the only age group carried by Gore. 
Bushs support fell among the youngest cohort, but only by four percentage 
points (Knuckey and Hadley 2002, 90-92). 
 A modest degree of social class-based voting was evident in Louisiana, 
with Bush easily carrying those with a household income of at least $50,000, 
and Kerry winning a large vote among those earning under $15,000. How-
ever, all income groupsexcept for those earning $30-50,000registered 
an increase in support for Bush compared to 2000. Indeed, the largest in-
creases in support were among those with an income below $15,000 (up 13 
percent) and those earning $15-30,000 (up 15 percent). This suggests issues 
or political forces other than social class were at work in Louisiana in 2004. 
 
Religion and Religiosity 
 
 One possible explanation for social class being less important to the 
vote in 2004 than in 2000 was the increased salience of religion and religios-
ity. Bush received a majority of the vote among both Protestants and Catho-
lics, but it was among the latter that he registered a large increase in his vote, 
up 11 percentage points compared to 2000, while his vote among Protestants 
remained the same. In contrast, Kerry won over three-quarters of the vote 
among both respondents of other denominations and those with no religious 
preference. This yielded little support for Kerry given that these groups 
comprise only 11 percent of the total Louisiana electorate. It appears, how-
ever, that it was among religiously committed Protestants and Catholics
those who attend church at least once a weekthat Bush resonated most, 
winning 73 and 71 percent of the vote respectively. Thus the Catholic-
Protestant cleavage that has often loomed large in the politics of Louisiana 
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(e.g., Howard 1971, ch X) seems to have been replaced by a religiosity 
cleavage, one that may reflect a more general cultural values divide evident 
in the South and, indeed, the nation. Such a development may also help 
explain the pro-Republican movement noted above in the heavily Cajun-
Catholic parishes of the Acadiana region. 
 A further point to note about the effects of religion in 2004 is that those 
respondents who identified themselves as white evangelicals or born-again 
Christians constituted the base of the Republican vote. Indeed, this group 
now exhibits levels of Republican loyalty in their voting behavior that rivals 
that found among blacks toward the Democrats. Based on the size and 
cohesiveness of the white evangelical vote, approximately 40 percent of 
Bushs statewide total came from this group although it comprises only 
27 percent of the state population. 
 
Party Identification and Ideology 
 
 As in 2000, the 2004 presidential election produced a loyalty gap 
with Bush winning 95 percent of Republican identifiers, compared to 
Kerrys 78 percent among self-identified Democrats. Indeed, the 21 percent 
of the vote Bush secured from Democrats was the largest Bush received in 
any of the eleven southern states. Perhaps most interesting was the fact that 
Democrats in Louisiana now have a party identification advantage of just 
two percentage points over Republicans. Although Louisiana was one of 
only two southern statesthe other being Arkansaswhere there was any 
Democratic advantage, this two-percentage point lead compares to a 14-
point advantage in 2000. While this finding has less effect on presidential 
elections (given the ability of Republican candidates to cut into the Demo-
cratic base and sweep independents), it has enormous consequences for party 
competition below the presidential level (see below) where Democrats 
traditionally relied on a partisan advantage over Republicans. 
 The voting behavior of respondents based on ideology also reflects the 
fact that both candidates appealed to the electoral bases of their respective 
parties, with Bush winning 80 percent of the vote among conservatives and 
Kerry 74 percent of the voter among liberals. Of course, as conservatives 
vastly outnumber liberals in Louisiana, such an ideologically polarized vote 
benefited Bush. As in 2000 (e.g., Black and Black 2002, ch. 8), Bush also 
won a majority of the vote among moderates. This is a crucial swing group 
in Louisiana, as it is throughout the South. In 2004, moderates remained 
virtually unchanged in the support they gave to both candidates compared 
to support received by Bush and Gore in 2000 (52 and 46 percent, respec-
tively). 
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Short-term Political Factors 
 
 In terms of important short-term factors influencing the presidential 
vote in Louisiana, Bush clearly had an advantage on both the issues and can-
didate qualities. Terrorism and moral values were cited as the most impor-
tant issues in Louisiana, issues where Bush had an overwhelming advantage 
over Kerry. While Kerry had a solid lead over Bush among those respon-
dents who cited domestic policy issues, i.e., the economy, health care, and 
education, as the most important reason for their vote choice, only 30 per-
cent of the electorate said that these traditional Democratic issues were the 
most important issues in 2004. 
 Bush also benefited from positive retrospective evaluations of his first 
term, with 58 percent of respondents approving of his job performance; 
Bush won 92 percent of their vote. Voters in Louisiana may have made pro-
spective evaluative judgments between Bush and Kerry, with Bush favored 
over Kerry as the candidate most trusted to handle the economy (56 to 39 
percent) and terrorism (59 to 35 percent). Again, those who said they trusted 
Bush more than they did Kerry voted overwhelmingly for Bush. 
 Lastly, Bush had an edge over Kerry on candidate qualities, with leads 
among those respondents who cited strong leadership, taking a clear 
stand on issues, religious faith, and honesty as the most important 
qualities. Collectively, 55 percent of respondents cited these qualities as 
most important. Kerry led Bush as the candidate that would bring change, 
cared about people and who was viewed as intelligent, but only 39 percent 
of the respondents cited these qualities as being most important. 
 
U.S. Senate Election 
 
 The central concern in the U.S. Senate election was whether Republi-
can David Vitter would be forced into a runoff election against a Democrat, 
most likely U.S. Representative Chris John. Most observers did not believe 
that Vitter would be able to secure a majority of the vote in the primary and 
would then likely face a strong challenge in a runoff where a moderate can-
didate like John could brand Vitter as an ideologically extreme conservative. 
This had been the formula that Democrats had employed in most statewide 
contests in Louisiana over the past two decades (Lamis 1990, ch. 8; Ren-
wick, Parent, and Wardlaw 1999). In 2004, this strategy did not work, and 
Vitter became Louisianas first Republican U.S. Senator since the Recon-
struction era, taking 51 percent of vote with John trailing far behind on 29.3 
percent. 
 Perhaps Vitters biggest asset was the coattail of President Bush, but he 
also had built a statewide grassroots organization, a great grass-roots net-
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work with local Louisiana folks in every parish said Vitter. In fact, The list 
of people . . . paid to coordinate volunteers [took] up dozens of pages of his 
760-plus page campaign finance report (Alpert 2004). A parish-by-parish 
analysis of the presidential and Senate elections shows a high correlation 
between the Bush/Vitter vote (r = .86). At the same time, Table 4 shows the 
breakdown of the Senate vote by region and demonstrates a similar structure 
to the pattern of support exhibited in the presidential contest. 
 Vitter was able to emerge from the Greater New Orleans area with a 
majority of the vote, sweeping the suburban parishes around New Orleans 
that constituted much of his congressional district, which offset his vote 
deficit in the city of New Orleans. Like Bush, Vitter also swept the tradi-
tional Republican regions of the Florida and North-Central parishes. Perhaps 
the biggest surprise was his ability to win a plurality (47.1 percent) of the 
vote in the Acadiana region. This was surprising, given that southwestern 
part of Acadiana was the location of Johns congressional district. Indeed, in 
the parishes that constituted Johns Seventh district, Vitter narrowly out-
polled John, 45.4 to 45.1 percent. Even assuming that the entire vote from 
the third place candidate John Kennedy had gone to John, this still would 
have left the Democrat winning a bare majority of 51.0 percent on his home 
turf. Again, the success of Bush in securing a landslide vote in Acadiana, an 
organization of paid grassroots organizers, and the willingness of voters to 
cast a straight-ticket party vote, appears to have help Vitter and hurt the 
Democrats prospects of forcing a runoff election in the U.S. Senate race.  
 Exit poll data provide further support for a presidential coattails effect 
favoring Vitter in the Senate. For example, Vitter was able to secure most of 
the Republican base, winning 88 percent of the vote from self-identified 
Republicans,  as  well  as  53  percent  of  the  votes  from  independents,  and  
 
 
Table 4. Louisiana 2004 U. S. Senate Vote by Region (in percent) 
 
 
 Proportion of 
Region State Vote Vitter John Kennedy 
 
 
Greater New Orleans   27.6 50.1 25.1 17.9 
Acadiana   31.0 47.1 37.8 11.3 
Florida Parishes   16.1 54.4 25.5 16.1 
North-Central   25.3 54.7 26.0  15.4 
 Total 100.0 51.0 29.3 14.3 
 
Note: See endnote 4 for a definition of the parishes than constitute each region. Row percentages do 
not add up to 100 because data for minor candidates are excluded. 
Source: Computed by the authors from election returns obtained from the Louisiana Secretary of 
State Elections Division; see www.sec.state.la.us/elections/elections-index.htm. 
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even 16 percent of the vote from Democratic identifiers. The prospects of 
party-line voting in statewide elections in Louisiana must be troublesome for 
the Democrats, especially given that the partys advantage in party 
identification has now disappeared. 
 Vitter also benefited from his partys unified support (Walsh 2004, 
A-26). Although both major parties in Louisiana are factionalized, Vitter 
was the only serious Republican to enter the Senate race, and even former 
Governor Foster endorsed him. The Democrats, in contrast, divided their 
support among three viable candidates, all of whom attacked each other 
during the primary, wounding each others chances of forcing Vitter into a 
runoff. 
 
U.S. House of Representatives Elections 
 
 Sparks flew in the 2004 U.S. House of Representatives elections in 
Louisiana, with open-seat elections in three of the seven districts, a party-
switching incumbent in yet another, and mud-slinging all around. When the 
dust had settled, the Republican advantage in House seats had gone from 4-3 
to 5-2, as each party lost one seat and gained another while one incumbent 
switched from the Democrats to the Republicans. 
 Incumbents under Louisianas open elections system tend to enjoy 
opposition-free reelection campaigns because there are no separate opposi-
tion-party primaries. Thus, most of the state U.S. House delegation
William Jefferson in District 2, Jim McCrery in District 4, Richard Baker in 
District 6, and even the party-switching Rodney Alexander in District 5
faced no more than token opposition. Alexanders switch to the Republican 
Party was highly controversial initially. He had registered to run as a Demo-
crat in August and then, two days later and only one half hour before the end 
of the official qualifying period, Alexander withdrew and re-registered as a 
Republican. The maneuver drew heated criticism from Republican opponent 
John Jock Scott, who saw his official Republican party endorsement dis-
appear as soon as the party had an incumbent to support; it drew equally 
heated criticism from Democratic opponent Zelma Tisa Blakes, who 
hoped to win over the districts Democratic voters with the help of high-
profile endorsements from Maya Angelou and civil rights activist Joseph 
Lowery. Democratic contributors to Alexanders campaign also were hop-
ping mad after his last-minute party swap. In the end, however, voters in the 
Fifth District, rural and Protestant . . . part of the Bible Belt [and] ardently 
pro-guns, anti-abortion and against gay marriage gave Alexander 59 per-
cent of their votes in the first primary, to Blakess 25 percent and Scotts 
16 percent (Ballard 2004). 
 Open-seat elections in Louisiana, as elsewhere, are generally candidate 
free-for-alls as congressional hopefuls scramble to replace the departing 
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incumbents. True to form, two of the open-seat races, those in Districts 3 
and 7, were vigorously contested and descended into mud-slinging brawls as 
candidates smeared each other with simplistic and personal attacks. Dis-
trict 1, on the other hand, was different. The conservative suburban New 
Orleans district had been Republican David Vitters before he ran for the 
Senate. Safely Republican, it provided an attractive opportunity for well-
known conservative politicians such as State Representative Steve Scalise. 
But when Bobby Jindal, the loser in the previous years gubernatorial runoff, 
moved from Baton Rouge into the district and subsequently jumped into the 
race, he scared off virtually all of the seriously viable opposition. Parlaying 
his high name recognition, high-level government experience, and conserva-
tive credentials into district-wide supportand this time not having to face 
rural voters reluctant to vote for a non-whiteJindal defeated an ill-funded 
and little-known field of five by winning 78 percent of the vote in the first 
primary held simultaneously with the presidential general election. 
 The contests in Districts 3 and 7 produced no outright winner in the 
first primary, and thus both went into early December runoff elections. 
Louisiana is the only U.S. state with an open election in November followed 
by possible runoff elections in December; every other state is finished by 
early November. Therefore, the eyes of Congress-watchers nationwide were 
on Louisiana as the last two congressional elections in the nation would 
determine the size of the House Republican majority. What they saw was a 
flurry of attack ads, personal smears, partisan bickering, and intra-party 
infighting (e.g., Brown 2004a; cf. Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 1991; Lau, 
Sigelman, Heldman, and Babbit 1999; and Lau and Pomper 2002). Combin-
ing the total party vote from the primary election suggested a Republican 
advantage in District 3, where Republican candidates received 59 percent of 
the primary vote. On the other hand, it was the Democrats with an edge in 
District 7, where the combined party vote was 52 percent. It should be noted, 
however, that George W. Bush received a landslide vote in both districts in 
the presidential election, 58 percent in District 3 and 60 percent in District 7. 
 Neither race, in fairness, was devoid of serious policy discussion over 
national and local issues. Candidates debated proposals on issues ranging 
from tax policy and job growth to international trade and the steady erosion 
of Louisianas coastline and fragile wetlands. Further, as the runoff cam-
paigns descended into lowbrow negativity, it was not just local politicians 
and consultants who spewed dirt. Both national parties created advertise-
ments that added to the smear-fest. Local politicians and national party offi-
cials alike had understood the lesson from the previous years gubernatorial 
campaign: negative advertising wins elections (Courreges 2004a, 2004b, and 
2004c; Brown 2004b; Maginnis 2004). 
 In District 7, Chris Johns former district encompassing most of 
Acadiana, the primary was marred by Democratic infighting, as candidate 
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Don Cravins, an African-American State Senator, railed against state and 
national party officials for backing State Senator Willie Mount, and refused 
to endorse her in the runoff. The runoff campaign between Mount and her 
Republican rival, retired heart surgeon Charles Boustany, Jr., featured attack 
ads galore. Boustanys campaign characterized Mount as a tax-loving anti-
business friend of John Kerry, one who wanted to make it easier to get the 
morning-after contraceptive pill; Mounts campaign portrayed Boustany 
as an inexperienced, over-privileged aristocrat who disdained the charity 
health system and who once aspired, unsuccessfully, to British royalty. Parti-
san and personal differences notwithstanding, both candidates held similar 
positions on most of the issues, and the campaign ended amicably when 
Boustany captured 55 percent of the vote to become the districts first 
elected Republican U.S. Representative (Courreges 2004c; Courreges and 
Simoneaux 2004).8 
 The campaign in District 3, running along Louisianas southeastern 
coast and encompassing parts of suburban New Orleans, also began with 
intra-party scuffles plaguing both parties. Rising from the fray to make the 
runoff were Republican Billy Tauzin III, enjoying instant name recognition 
by virtue of the districts popular retiring U.S. Representative Billy Tauzin, 
Jr., and Democrat Charlie Melancon, a former president of the American 
Sugar Cane League. Attack ads during the runoff campaign depicted Melan-
con as a man ready to raise taxes and fees while promoting third-grade sex 
education, and Tauzin as an immature and inexperienced scofflaw hoping to 
capitalize on his daddys fame. Melancon captured the district for the Demo-
crats by a razor-thin margin of some 500 votes. Sugar, as in Mary Landrieus 
2002 Senate victory, may have tilted the scales toward Melancon, the sugar 
cane executive who pledged to block international trade agreements that 
might threaten Louisiana sugar farmers livelihood. (See Courreges 2004b, 
2004c; Nichols 2005; Brown 2004c; Brown 2004d.) 
 
Conclusion: A Republican Future? 
 
 The 2004 elections in Louisiana must be considered one of the best in 
the states history for the Republican Party. At the presidential level, a state 
that some observers speculated could be in play in the general election pro-
duced a landslide victory for President George W. Bush. Regardless of the 
candidates nominated by both parties in 2008, Louisiana should be con-
sidered a safe state for the GOP, especially now that the Acadiana region, 
the one region of state that offered some hope for the Democrats in winning 
white support, appears to have moved decisively in a pro-Republican direc-
tion. At the same time, the congressional elections produced an historic U.S. 
Senate victory for the Republicans, with David Vitter becoming the first 
Louisiana: Hot and Spicy!  |  81 
Republican senator from the state since the Reconstruction era. That Vitter 
was able to accomplish this without being forced into a runoff election 
should be worrying for Louisiana Democrats. In competition for U.S. House 
seats, Republicans now hold a 5-2 majority. Perhaps the only welcome 
news, and hardly enough to offset the presidential and Senate results, was 
the fact that the Democrats won two congressional districts. However, given 
that their newly won district voted heavily for Bush in 2004, the Democratic 
incumbent Charlie Melancon may face a strong Republican challenge in 
2006. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that Melancon may follow the 
example of other conservative Democrats in the state and switch parties. 
 The next major statewide elections are not until 2007, when Governor 
Kathleen Blanco faces re-election. While Blanco now possesses an incum-
bency advantage, a unified Republican party could still mount a formidable 
challenge if voters engage in the same type of party-line voting that charac-
terized the 2004 elections. Republicans may also begin to make advances 
in the state legislature. Currently, Democrats hold a solid majority of seats 
in both the State House of Representatives (65 percent) and State Senate 
(67 percent). However, Republican advances here and in other elections at 
the state and local level appear likely if voters continue to engage in partisan 
voting. Still, Louisianas free-for-all open elections system, the large supply 
of moderate to conservative Democrats ready to support guns and oppose 
abortion and gay marriage, and local issues from sugar to coastal erosion to 
Saints football may all conspire to keep the state competitive in the foresee-
able future. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
 1While Breaux, had he run, would undoubtedly have been the odds-on favorite to 
have won, his decision not to maybe was influenced by considerations concerning the 
tight balance of power in the U.S. Senate. Breaux would have had to give up his Senate 
seat to run for governor, meaning that Republican Governor Mike Foster could appoint a 
Republican as a replacement. 
 2A correlation analysis of the parish-by-parish vote certainly suggests a different 
structure to her vote as compared to that for other statewide Democratic candidates. For 
example, the correlation coefficient between Blancos vote and that for U.S. Senator 
Mary Landrieu in the 2002 Senate race and Al Gore in the 2000 presidential race were 
fairly modest, r = .60 and .49, respectively. For a thorough discussion of possible racial 
backlash voting against Jindal, see Skinner and Klinkner 2004. 
 3Turnout rates that are based on the voting age population were taken from 
www.uselectionatlas.org. Turnout data based on voter registration were taken from the 
Louisiana Secretary of State Elections Division, Voting Registration and Statistics 
www.sec.state.la.us/elections/elect-votereg-stats.htm#votestats. 
 4Regions were defined as follows: Greater New Orleans includes Jefferson, 
Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, and St. Tammany Parishes. Acadiana includes 
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Acadia, Ascension, Assumption, Avoyelles, Calcasieu, Cameron, Evangeline, Iberville, 
Jefferson Davis, Lafayette, Lafourche, Pointe Coupee, St. Charles, St. James, St. John the 
Baptist, St. Landry, St. Martin, St. Mary, Terrebonne, Vermilion, and West Baton Rouge 
Parishes. Florida Parishes include East Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Livingston, 
St. Helena, Tangipahoa, Washington, and West Feliciana. North-Central includes Allen, 
Beauregard, Bienville, Bossier, Caddo, Caldwell, Catahoula, Claiborne, Concordia, De 
Soto, East Carroll, Franklin, Grant, Jackson, La Salle, Lincoln, Madison, Morehouse, 
Natchitoches, Ouachita, Rapides, Red River, Richland, Sabine, Tensas, Union, Vernon, 
Webster, West Carroll, and Winn Parishes. 
 5On the previously strong Democratic loyalties of white voters in Acadiana, see 
Renwick, Parent, and Wardlaw (1994, 303). On the importance of abortion and other 
cultural issues to Republican support in Acadiana, see Parent 2004, 53. 
 6See How Louisiana Voted 2004 for the parish by parish presidential vote. 
 7The estimate of Mondales white vote is taken from Black and Black (1992, 335). 
Based on this analysis, George McGovern was the only other Democratic presidential 
nominee to receive a lower share of the white vote in Louisiana, winning an estimated 
15 percent in 1972. 
 8The Republicans had held District 7 for two years when Democrat Jimmy Hayes 
switched parties following the 1994 midterm elections. Hayes gave up the seat for an 
unsuccessful U.S. Senate bid in 1996, and it was recaptured for the Democrats by Chris 
John. 
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